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Abstract—The roll-out of smart meters in electricity networks
introduces risks for consumer privacy due to increased measure-
ment frequency and granularity. Through various Non-Intrusive
Load Monitoring techniques, consumer behavior may be inferred
from their metering data. In this paper, we propose an energy
management method that reduces energy cost and protects
privacy through the minimization of information leakage. The
method is based on a Model Predictive Controller that utilizes
energy storage and local generation, and that predicts the effects
of its actions on the statistics of the actual energy consumption
of a consumer and that seen by the grid. Computationally, the
method requires solving a Mixed-Integer Quadratic Program of
manageable size whenever new meter readings are available. We
simulate the controller on generated residential load profiles with
different privacy costs in a two-tier time-of-use energy pricing
environment. Results show that information leakage is effectively
reduced at the expense of increased energy cost. The results also
show that with the proposed controller the consumer load profile
seen by the grid resembles a mixture between that obtained with
Non-Intrusive Load Leveling and Lazy Stepping.
Index Terms—Consumer Privacy, Energy Management Unit,
Model Predictive Control, Mutual Information, Optimization
Methods, Smart Meter
I. INTRODUCTION
Globally, traditional electromechanical electricity meters are
being replaced by Smart Meters (SMs) as part of efforts
to modernize the grid in order to better manage electricity
generation and distribution. In Europe, this is mandated by
the European Commission under its Third Energy Package,
requiring member states to roll-out SMs where cost-benefit
analyses are positive [1]. However, with their ability to provide
real-time information on consumer demand, SMs also raise
concerns regarding consumer privacy [2], [3]. By measuring
energy demand at much higher frequencies than traditional
meters, detailed consumer load profiles can be extracted from
SM data. Through Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM)
techniques, which were first studied by Hart in 1989 [4]
and further developed through the years [5], [6], individual
appliance usage, and ultimately consumer lifestyle patterns,
preferences, and occupancy profiles can be inferred [7]–[9].
Such data may not only be accessible to Utility Providers
(UPs) but also to malicious third parties, as metering infras-
tructures are vulnerable to attacks that lead to information
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leakage [10]. Moreover, if one also considers UPs being
untrustworthy parties, privacy concerns stemming from SM
roll-outs become much more severe, and can even lead to
backlashes against their installation [11].
To counter this, various works have been done in order
to protect consumer privacy. While some focus on cyber
measures, such as encryption, adding noise to achieve differ-
ential privacy [12], and consumer aggregation, others address
the problem through physical means, e.g., load control [13]
and battery load hiding (BLH) [14], [15]. BLH techniques
mask consumer load by charging and discharging a battery
to alter the load profile captured by SMs. For example, in
[14], the authors use a best-effort algorithm to hide consumer
load change, whilst [15] details a load-leveling method that
switches its energy consumption based on the battery’s state-
of-charge. The authors in [16], on the other hand, introduce
a stepping algorithm that improves upon the performance of
best-effort and load-leveling algorithms. While privacy loss
metrics, e.g., Mutual Information and Fischer Information,
have been used to assess BLH schemes such as in [16],
the schemes themselves have been primarily heuristics-driven.
Cyber-physical methods proposed for minimizing directly a
specific privacy loss measure such as mutual information have
so far been mainly theoretical [17], [18].
In general, BLH methods proposed in the literature for
privacy protection have not directly considered energy cost in
the control policies. Any cost savings obtained have been a by-
product of the privacy protection scheme. In these methods, the
level of privacy protection is closely linked to storage capacity
[16], [19], but privacy protection alone is unlikely to justify
the cost of investment on high-capacity storage devices, which
according to estimates by [20] remains high. Utilizing energy
storage for minimizing energy cost in addition to providing
privacy protection is critical for justifying this investment.
Methods that focus on minimizing energy cost alone have
been the subject of many works. Examples of recent work
include [21], [22], where the authors utilize batteries in a
Model Predictive Control (MPC) scheme to minimize energy
costs in a varying-price environment by charging during low-
price periods to compensate consumer load during high-price
periods.
In this paper, we propose a new scheme based on MPC that
combines energy cost minimization with privacy protection
that directly minimizes mutual information. The proposed
scheme introduces binary variables in the MPC optimization
subproblems for counting predicted observations and estimat-
ing the joint statistics of consumer load and the net load seen
by the grid (grid load). This allows the controller to predict
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Fig. 1: Energy System Model.
the effects of its actions on the mutual information between
these two load profiles. Computationally, the proposed scheme
requires solving Mixed-Integer Quadratic Programs (MIQPs)
of manageable size whenever new meter readings are available.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
describes the problem considered. Section III presents our
proposed solution approach. Section IV details implementation
and numerical experiments. Lastly, Section V summarizes this
work and provides an outlook on future research.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider the problem of minimizing energy cost and
reducing information leakage about the load profile of an
energy consumer. The system considered consists of an Energy
Management Unit (EMU) that uses energy storage, local
generation, and energy available from the grid to supply
the consumer load in a cost-effective and privacy-concerned
manner. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Mathematically, the
system is represented by the discrete-time random process{
(St, Gt, Ct, Xt, Yt) | t ∈ Z+
}
,
where St is the energy supplied to the energy storage, Gt is
the energy supplied by the local generation, Ct is the price
of energy, Xt is the consumer energy demand, and Yt is the
energy demand seen by the grid during time interval t, i.e.,
Yt = Xt + St −Gt. (1)
This implies that no energy wastage is allowed. The realiza-
tions of these random variables are denoted by st, gt, ct, xt,
and yt, respectively, for each time t.
The battery charging energy St is constrained by
Smin ≤ St ≤ Smax (2)
during each time interval t, where −Smin ≥ 0 is the maximum
discharging energy and Smax ≥ 0 is the maximum charging
energy at a constant power over a single time interval. These
constraints are given by the power rating of the device. It is
assumed that the charge and discharge efficiencies are equal,
and we denote these with α ∈ (0, 1). The state of charge of
the energy storage device at the beginning of time interval t
is denoted by Et and satisfies
Et+1 = Et + α1{St ≥ 0}St + α−11{St < 0}St, (3)
for each t, where 1{A} = 1 when A is true and 0 otherwise.
It is also assumed for simplicity that the energy storage device
is not used to provide ancillary services to the grid, allowing
the full use of its capacity, and as such is constrained by
0 ≤ Et ≤ Emax, (4)
where Emax is the maximum energy storage capacity of the
device. Additionally, it is assumed in our system that the
local generation is deterministic in nature and that the EMU
has perfect prior knowledge regarding its output. The future
consumer loads Xt as well as the energy prices Ct are also
assumed to be known to the EMU. In practice, only noisy
predictions would be available but the incorporation of such
uncertainties is part of a future work. With regards to the grid,
we assume that no energy feed-in to the grid is allowed and
that the energy supplied is bounded by Y max, the maximum
connection capacity available on the distribution feeder cables
(or circuit breakers), i.e.,
0 ≤ Yt ≤ Y max. (5)
The energy cost at each time interval t is given by CtYt.
On the other hand, loss of consumer privacy is measured by
the information leakage rate of consumer load given grid load,
which following [23] is given by
I
(
Xbtc;Y btc
)
:=
∫
X
∫
Y
pX,Y (x0, y0, . . . , xt, yt)×
log
pX,Y (x0, y0, . . . , xt, yt)
pX(x0, . . . , xt)pY (y0, . . . , yt)
dy dx .
Here, Xbtc := (X0, . . . , Xt), Y btc := (Y0, . . . , Yt), pX,Y ,
pX and pY denote the probability density functions of(
Xbtc, Y btc
)
, Xbtc and Y btc, respectively, and log denotes the
base-2 logarithm. Quantifying the cost of privacy loss through
a non-negative constant µ with units of Rp-per-bit (100 Rp =
1 CHF), we seek to find a causal and implementable control
policy U ∈ U that minimizes the total time-average expected
cost. Such a policy determines the charge and discharge of the
energy storage device during each time interval t based on the
observation history up to that time, i.e.,
St = U(X
btc, Cbtc, Gbtc, Y bt−1c, Sbt−1c),
where Cbtc, Gbtc and Sbtc are defined in analogous ways to
Xbtc and Y btc. Mathematically, the problem can be posed as
finding a policy U∗ such that
U∗ = arg min
U∈U
f(U), (6)
where
f(U) := lim
T¯→∞
1
T¯ + 1

T¯∑
τ=0
E[CτYτ ] + µI
(
XbT¯c;Y bT¯c
)
and E[ · ] denotes expectation.
III. MODEL-DISTRIBUTION PREDICTIVE CONTROL
We propose an approach based on MPC to find a control
policy that is close to U∗. At time t, the controller (EMU)
observes the realizations xt, gt, ct, and et (energy storage state
of charge), determines actions st, . . . , st+T for a prediction
horizon of length T , executes action st to achieve a desirable
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grid load yt, and repeats the process in a receding horizon
manner.
Since the exact evaluation of the information leakage rate
I(Xbtc;Y btc) is not possible without knowing the probability
density functions pX,Y and pY , which depend on the control
actions, we propose using an approximation. This is done by
first assuming that for τ near time t, (Xτ , Yτ ) are independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of a pair of random
variables (X˜t, Y˜t). More specifically, this is assumed during
the time window {t + T − N + 1, . . . , t + T}, which has
length N  T and covers both the recent past and the
entire prediction horizon with respect to time t. While time
independence does not hold in reality, we make this strong
assumption as a first step in making the problem tractable.
Time correlation and other properties will be studied in future
work. Letting X [t] := (Xt−M+1, . . . , Xt+T ) and Y [t] :=
(Yt−M+1, . . . , Yt+T ), where M := N−T , and approximating
the average information leakage per time interval using
I(Xbt+Tc;Y bt+Tc)
t+ T + 1
≈ I(X
[t];Y [t])
N
,
the locally i.i.d. assumption then gives that
I(Xbt+Tc;Y bt+Tc)
t+ T + 1
≈ I(X
[t];Y [t])
N
=
t+T∑
τ=t−M+1
I(Xτ ;Yτ )
N
=
t+T∑
τ=t−M+1
I(X˜t; Y˜t)
N
= I(X˜t, Y˜t), (7)
where first equality stems from time independence, and the
second equality from the random variables being identically
distributed.
Furthermore, for the purpose of approximating mutual in-
formation only, we assume that the random variables X˜t and
Y˜t can take on only a finite number of energy levels that
are evenly spaced by 2∆, i.e., X˜t ∈ {x1, x2, ..., xm} and
Y˜t ∈ {y1, y2, ..., yn}, where x1 −∆ = 0, xm + ∆ = Xmax,
y1 − ∆ = 0, and yn + ∆ = Y max. The value Xmax can
be computed from historical records. From this assumption, it
follows that
I(X˜t; Y˜t) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pX˜,Y˜ (x
i, yj) log
pX˜,Y˜ (x
i, yj)
pX˜(x
i)pY˜ (y
j)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pX˜,Y˜ (x
i, yj) log
pY˜ |X˜(y
j |xi)
pY˜ (y
j)
, (8)
where pX˜,Y˜ , pX˜ , pY˜ and pY˜ |X˜ denote the probability mass
functions of
(
X˜t, Y˜t
)
, X˜t, Y˜t and Y˜t given X˜t, respectively.
Since (Xτ , Yτ ) are assumed to be i.i.d samples of (X˜t, Y˜t)
for τ ∈ {t + T − N + 1, . . . , t + T}, the statistics of these
random variables are approximated by the relative frequency
t t + Tt ‐ M + 1 t ‐ N + 1
N
Fig. 2: Counting window for probability estimation at time t.
of events during this time window, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
More specifically,
pX˜,Y˜ (x
i, yj) ≈
∑t+T
τ=t−M+1 1{(xτ , yτ ) = (xi, yj)}+ ε
N +mnε
pX˜(x
i) ≈
∑t+T
τ=t−M+1 1{xτ = xi}+ nε
N +mnε
pY˜ (y
j) ≈
∑t+T
τ=t−M+1 1{yτ = yj}+mε
N +mnε
,
where ε > 0. The addition of the positive scalar ε in
the probability estimates corresponds to additive smoothing
[24]. This is done to avoid probability estimates of zero for
events for which there are no observations during the time
window. This probability estimation strategy, albeit simplistic,
constitutes an adequate choice for a first step towards exploring
the proposed methodology of including in MPC the ability
to estimate the statistical effects of the control actions in
a tractable manner. Including more sophisticated probability
estimation techniques into this methodology is an interesting
subject for future work.
Since at time t the counting window covers the recent past
and the prediction horizon, the probability estimates can be
separated into parts that are constants and parts that depend
on the controller’s actions during the prediction horizon. More
specifically, they can be expressed as
pX˜,Y˜ (x
i, yj) ≈ aijt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ (9)
pY˜ (y
j) ≈ bjt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
m∑
k=1
zkjτ , (10)
where Nε := N + mnε, a
ij
t and b
j
t are constants (at time t)
defined by
aijt :=
∑t−1
τ=t−M+1 1{(xτ , yτ ) = (xi, yj)}+ ε
Nε
bjt :=
∑t−1
τ=t−M+1 1{yτ = yj}+mε
Nε
,
and zijτ := 1{(xτ , yτ ) = (xi, yj)} for τ ∈ {t, . . . , t + T},
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} are binary variables that
depend on the controller’s actions and forecasts during the
prediction horizon. Letting cit := pX˜(x
i), which is a constant
at time t due to the perfect prediction assumption on consumer
load, it follows from (9) and (10) that
pY˜ |X˜(y
j |xi) ≈ a
ij
t
cit
+
1
citNε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ .
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From these expressions for probability estimates and (8), we
then have the approximation
I(X˜t; Y˜t) ≈ I¯(X˜t; Y˜t)
:=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
aijt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ
)
×{
log
(
aijt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ
)
−
log
(
bjt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
m∑
k=1
zkjτ
)
− log cit
}
, (11)
which is a fairly complicated function of the binary variables
zijτ . Since N  T , this approximation can be simplified by re-
placing the logarithms with their first-order Taylor expansions
around the constant part of their arguments, i.e.,
log
(
aijt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ
)
≈ log aijt +
log′
(
aijt
)( 1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ
)
log
(
bjt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
m∑
k=1
zkjτ
)
≈ log bjt +
log′
(
bjt
)( 1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
m∑
k=1
zkjτ
)
.
Using these Taylor expansions and letting ν := 1/ loge 2, we
obtain the approximation
I(X˜t; Y˜t) ≈ I˜(X˜t; Y˜t)
:=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
aijt +
1
Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ
)
×{
log
aijt
bjtc
i
t
+
ν
aijt Nε
t+T∑
τ=t
zijτ −
ν
bjtNε
t+T∑
τ=t
m∑
k=1
zkjτ
}
, (12)
which is now a quadratic function of the binary variables zijτ .
An important observation is that the curvature of the loga-
rithm functions grows rapidly as zero is approached. Since the
constants aijt and b
j
t can be potentially very small for some
i and j due to the absence of observations of the associated
events in the time window {t−M + 1, . . . , t− 1} and a poor
choice of ε for additive smoothing, the Taylor expansions of
the logarithms can be very poor. Hence, we propose choosing
a bound ρ for log′
(
aijt
)
and log′
(
bjt
)
that ensures that the
logarithms are always expanded sufficiently away from zero.
Since
log′
(
aijt
)
=
ν
aijt
≤ N +mnε
ε
ν
and
log′
(
bjt
)
=
ν
bjt
≤ ν
aijt
= log′
(
aijt
)
,
it follows that setting ε ≥ N/(ρν−1 −mn) ensures that both
log′
(
aijt
)
and log′
(
bjt
)
are always bounded by ρ.
Using (7) and the definition of I˜(X˜t, Y˜t), the ideal objec-
tive function for the MPC optimization problem that exactly
captures energy cost minimization and privacy protection is
approximated as follows:
1
T + 1
t+T∑
τ=t
cτyτ +
1
T + t+ 1
µI
(
Xbt+Tc;Y bt+Tc
)
≈ 1
T + 1
t+T∑
τ=t
cτyτ + µI˜
(
X˜t; Y˜t
)
.
Hence, the proposed MPC scheme consists of solving at each
time t the optimization problem
minimize
s,e,y,z,w
1
T + 1
t+T∑
τ=t
cτyτ + µΦ(z) (13)
subject to (s, e, y, z, w) ∈ Ft,
where Φ(z) := I˜
(
X˜t; Y˜t
)
measures privacy loss,
s := {sτ}t+Tτ=t , e := {eτ}t+Tτ=t , y := {yτ}t+Tτ=t
are continuous optimization variables, z is the collection of
binary optimization variables defined by
z :=
{
zijτ
∣∣∣∣∣ τ ∈ {t, . . . , t+ T},
j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
i = arg min
k∈{1,...,m}
‖xτ − xk‖2
}
,
and w := {wτ}t+Tτ=t are binary variables used to represent the
indicator functions in (3). Note that not all binary variables
used in (11) are treated as optimization variables in (13). This
is because many of them are known by the controller to be
zero at time t since xτ is assumed to be known, and for each
τ ∈ {t, . . . , t+ T}, there is exactly one i such that
i = arg min
k∈{1,...,m}
‖xτ − xk‖2.
The constraint (s, e, y, z, w) ∈ Ft enforces the binary restric-
tions on z and w, the system constraints (1)-(5), the constraint
n∑
j=1
zijτ = 1 (14)
for each τ ∈ {t, . . . , t+ T}, and the constraint
zijτ = 1 ⇐⇒ j = arg min
k∈{1,...,n}
‖yτ − yk‖2 (15)
for each τ ∈ {t, . . . , t+ T} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Due to (14),
the constraints (5) and (15) can be represented together by the
linear constraints
n∑
k=1
zikτ y
k −∆ ≤ yτ <
n∑
k=1
zikτ y
k + ∆.
Problem (13) is therefore an MIQP with (n+1)(T +1) binary
variables, roughly 3(T + 1) continuous variables, and roughly
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9(T + 1) linear constraints. Problem (13) is also recursively
feasible [25] as long as the maximum consumer energy de-
mand is less than the maximum allowable grid energy demand,
i.e., Xmax ≤ Y max, and if generation curtailment is allowed.
This stems from the fact that the grid can make up for any
energy shortfall, local generation in excess of consumption
and storage is curtailable, and mutual information is penalised
in the objective function and not formulated as a constraint.
In this work, generation curtailment is not considered as local
generation is assumed to be deterministic and zero; but this
can easily be included.
Since this proposed MPC scheme predicts the effects of the
controller’s actions on the probability distribution of random
variables, we refer to it as Model-Distribution Predictive
Control, or MDPC.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The proposed scheme was implemented in YALMIP [26]
and MATLAB R2015a using the IBM CPLEX 12.6.3 solver.
Simulations were done using consumer load profiles generated
with tools from [27] over a period of approximately one
month (30 days) with hourly resolution in a two-tier time-
of-use energy pricing environment. The computer used for the
simulations was an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU with 3.40 GHz of
clock speed, and 16.0 GB of RAM.
In order to solve the MIQP problems (13) reliably and
reduce the number of solution candidates, a convex penalty
term r(y) based on the l1-norm was added to the objective
function. This is given by
r(y) =
µσT−1‖Qy − y¯‖1
γ(‖Qx− x¯‖1 + ‖Qg − g¯‖1) + 1 ,
where σ and γ are positive constants, and y, x and g are
grid load, consumer load and local generation vectors used in
problem (13) for time t. The matrix Q extracts components
that correspond to times t, ..., t+T−1, and y¯, x¯, and g¯ denote
values of Yτ , Xτ , and Gτ for τ = t, ..., t + T − 1 predicted
during the solution of problem (13) for time t− 1. This term
is normalised for the prediction horizon length, and designed
to encourage the controller to choose a set of actions at time t
that is similar to those predicted at time t−1 in the absence of
forecast errors. The values of σ and γ may be chosen such that
r(y) does not dominate the objective function, and hence are
dependent on the characteristics of a particular data set. Note
that the value of γ is negligible for this work as generation
is assumed to be zero and the consumer load is perfectly
known, i.e., there are no forecast errors. Without the r(y) term,
the MIQP solver would spend an excessive amount of time
performing branch-and-bound searches and utilize excessive
memory resources trying to solve certain instances of (13).
Unless stated otherwise, the parameters shown in Table I
were used for the simulations. Local generation was set to
zero throughout the entire simulation period in order to clearly
observe the effects of the controller actions. A battery was used
as the energy storage device, and the parameters chosen were
those of a Tesla Powerwall.
TABLE I: Default Simulation Parameters.
T : 12 Reg. Coefficient, σ: 0.11
M : 120 Battery Capacity: 6.4 kWh
N : 132 Battery Power: 3.3 kW
m: 15 Battery Efficiencies, α: 96 %
n: 15 Energy Price (high): 24.6 Rp/kWh
ε: 0.1 Energy Price (low): 13.15 Rp/kWh
A. Visualization of Load Profiles and Control Actions
Fig. 3 illustrates the actual consumer load and the load
seen by the grid over seven days for two different prices
of privacy loss, µ = 0 and µ = 18. For µ = 0, the
controller optimizes for energy costs only, and thus charges the
battery during low-price periods and compensates consumer
load during the high-price periods. This can be seen in Fig.
4(a) and 4(b), which show the charge and discharge of the
battery, and the battery state of charge over a period of seven
days. Periods highlighted in green indicate low-price periods.
With the chosen horizon length of 12, the controller is unable
to fully utilize the battery’s capacity as the consumer load
“seen” by it is generally less than the battery’s capacity.
With a price of privacy loss of µ = 18, the controller now
charges over high-price periods as well, as seen in Fig. 4(a),
in order to mask low consumer load periods. This results in
a grid load curve that shows a stepping behavior similar to
that obtained in [16], with periods of load leveling similar to
those obtained in [15]. Note that the correlation and thus also
the mutual information of consumer and grid loads is greatly
reduced for µ = 18. This can be seen more clearly in Fig.
5, which illustrates the estimated distribution of (X˜t, Y˜t). For
µ = 18 (right plot), the grid load concentrates in the two levels
despite consumer load levels being spread out. For µ = 0,
while correlation between X˜t and Y˜t is reduced by the battery
charging during low-price hours to compensate consumption
during high-price hours, it is still possible for an adversary to
reconstruct the consumer load based on observations of the
grid load with knowledge of energy prices and the battery
system specifications, as discussed in [16].
B. Performance of the MDPC Scheme
The proposed scheme was evaluated using I¯(X˜t; Y˜t), equiv-
alently (11), with a static window of length N = 718 that
encompasses the entire simulation period of approximately 30
days. This “cumulative” approximation of mutual information
is denoted by Ic. For reference, a system without a battery
using the same simulation setup had a total energy consump-
tion of 534 kWh, energy costs of 125 CHF, and privacy loss
of Ic = 2.58 bits.
In Fig. 6, the total energy costs and mutual information
Ic for different battery capacities are shown as a function of
the price µ of privacy loss. As can be seen from the figure,
energy costs increase with the drop in mutual information,
as the battery charges during high-price periods to mask low
consumer loads, as previously shown in Fig. 4(a). While it
would be possible for consumer behavior to be inferred with
µ = 0, the mutual information value with a 3.3 kWh battery
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Fig. 3: Consumer vs grid load.
(a) Control actions of the battery
(b) Battery state of charge
Fig. 4: Control actions of the battery and its state of charge.
Fig. 5: Distribution of consumer and grid loads.
for energy cost optimization only is already approximately half
that of the no-battery case.
Similar to the findings in [16], the size of the battery relative
to the total consumer load over a high-low consumption
cycle determines the level of privacy protection that can be
achieved. Privacy loss is minimal with a battery capacity that
sufficiently covers the consumer load during a typical day. In
the case of the simulated consumer load, this battery capacity
(a) Mutual information
(b) Total energy cost
Fig. 6: Comparison of different battery capacities.
Fig. 7: Mutual information when energy cost is ignored.
is approximately 6.4 kWh, with a 12.8 kWh battery only
achieving slightly better performance in terms of privacy loss
reduction for moderate values of µ. However, energy cost
reduction improves with a larger battery, since it also allows
covering the consumption during periods of high energy price
and low load.
As seen in Fig. 6(a), minimum privacy loss is achieved with
a price of privacy loss of about 20 Rp/bit for a 6.4 kWh battery.
Beyond this price of privacy loss, the system limitations (or
the limitations of the measure Ic) impede the controller from
doing better, and the mutual information is seen to fluctuate
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around the minimum value. These fluctuations are caused by
the inherent randomness that is present in the scheme, as well
as due to the finiteness of the simulation period. This is seen
Fig. 7, which shows how Ic varies as the price of privacy
loss increases even when the energy cost is ignored. It can
be seen that the “width” of these fluctuations is roughly 0.1
bits. They arise in part from the MIQP solver finding multiple
solution candidates and choosing different ones, and hence
affecting the system trajectory, purely due to the scaling of
the objective function, which is completely controlled by µ
when the energy cost is ignored.
The effect of the number of quantization levels of X˜t and
Y˜t, which are m and n, respectively, and of the charge-
discharge rate limit of the battery on the performance of the
proposed controller were also studied. Fig. 8 shows Ic as a
function of µ for different number of quantization levels and
battery power ratings. For the evaluation of the quantization
levels, (m,n) = (20, 20) was used. Increasing the number
of quantization levels for the same maximum load allows
the controller to potentially achieve lower levels of privacy
loss because it is now able to take advantage of the higher
resolution to fine-tune its control actions. However, this also
generally increases the fluctuation amplitude or variability of
Ic due to the MIQP solver finding a larger set of candidate
solutions. Nonetheless, smaller quantization levels could also
result in large fluctuations when evaluated at higher resolutions
due to the coarse level of controller actions, such as in the case
of (m,n) = (10, 10). The battery power ratings on the other
hand impose a limit on the controller’s ability to mask changes
in consumer load. For the considered simulation setup with
a maximum consumer load of 3.6 kW and a battery energy
capacity of 6.4 kWh, a battery rating of 3.3 kW is almost
sufficient. This can be seen in Fig. 8(b), where a battery with
a 6.6 kW power rating marginally improves performance. A
battery with a 1.65 kW rating is sufficient for lower prices
of privacy loss, as energy cost reduction is the main driver
of control actions in such cases. However, at higher prices of
privacy loss the controller is unable to fully mask the consumer
load peaks that occur mainly during high-energy-price periods,
as shown in Fig. 4(a).
Additionally, as discussed in Section IV-A, a horizon length
of T = 12 is insufficient for the controller to predict the
load and fully charge the battery to minimize energy costs
and mask consumer loads during the later stage of high
energy price periods. Hence, the controller was simulated
with different horizon lengths to study its performance and
computational requirements. Table II and Fig. 9 summarize the
results obtained. As can be seen from Fig. 9, prediction length
mainly affects the energy cost because it allows the controller
to anticipate consumer load that occur farther in the future.
Increasing T to 18 reduces energy costs, and generally also
reduces privacy-loss, due to the controller being able to fully
utilize the capacity of the 6.4 kWh battery. However, there
are exceptions to this due to the randomness in the scheme,
which is exacerbated by longer horizons since they enlarge
the solution space and increase the number of candidate MIQP
solutions. It is important to note that computational tractability
is still maintained with T = 24 despite having a median solver
(a) Discretization levels
(b) Battery power ratings
Fig. 8: Effects of discretization levels and battery power
ratings on mutual information.
(a) Mutual information
(b) Total energy costs
Fig. 9: Comparison of different prediction horizon lengths
time of 57 times that of T = 12. However, as seen in Table
II, the maximum solver time increases exponentially with the
the prediction horizon. Further increasing the horizon length
to T = 30 makes it computationally impractical for a realistic
controller as it requires more than one and a half hours using
the current implementation to solve a single MIQP problem,
which needs to be completed in under an hour to be practical.
Note that for the energy pricing structure and consumer load
profile in the simulation setting, a horizon length of 18 appears
to be sufficient. However, this should not be generalized to
other simulation settings and load profiles. In general, using
the scheme proposed, a controller that is able to predict longer
time periods while maintaining tractability should perform
better.
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TABLE II: Comparison Between Different Horizon Lengths.
µ = 0 µ = 15 µ = 45
T = 12 T = 18 T = 24 T = 12 T = 18 T = 24 T = 12 T = 18 T = 24
Max Solver Time (s) 0.072 0.085 0.112 1.14 11.0 152 1.39 11.4 211
Min Solver Time (s) 0.024 0.027 0.036 0.053 0.109 1.59 0.053 0.092 1.28
Mean Solver Time (s) 0.031 0.039 0.048 0.161 1.03 9.26 0.152 0.961 10.3
Median Solver Time (s) 0.030 0.036 0.045 0.126 0.712 5.64 0.117 0.667 5.60
Fig. 10: Time series of mutual information with different
prediction horizon lengths
C. Time Evolution of Mutual Information
In order to study the change in mutual information with
time, we evaluated the controller’s performance with µ = 45
for the three different horizon lengths discussed in Section
IV-B using I¯(X˜t; Y˜t), i.e., (11), with a moving window of
length N = 132. This “time-dependent” approximation of
mutual information is denoted by It. For each time t, the
window considered the observation history from time t−N+1
to time t, as shown in Fig. 2, hence it was based on the
actual implemented controller actions. The graphs obtained
of It are shown in Fig. 10. As seen from the plot, the
results are consistent with the findings in Section IV-B,
where longer horizon lengths also lead to generally lower
mutual information over time. Note that mutual information
does not change monotonically over time due to changing
consumer load, the inherent randomness in the scheme, and the
logarithm linearizations done by the controller, which make
it overestimate the mutual information to varying degrees
depending on the statistics of X˜t and Y˜t. The latter can be
seen in Fig. 11, which now shows I¯(X˜t; Y˜t) with the time
window {t −M + 1, . . . , t + T} for µ = 20 and T = 12,
and the approximation with linearized logarithms used by the
controller, (12), which is denoted by I˜(X˜t; Y˜t). As seen on
the plot, at certain times, the discrepancy introduced by the
linearization leads to the controller taking actions that are
expected to reduce mutual information, but in fact increase it.
For example, this can be seen around the time corresponding
to 11 AM on the 23rd of January and at 5 PM on the 30th of
January. Around 6 AM on the 30th of January, on the other
hand, this is reversed: mutual information is reduced when the
controller predicted actions that supposedly increased mutual
information. These periods are highlighted in grey on Fig. 11.
D. Comparison of MDPC and Load-Leveling
In the interest of comparing the performance of the proposed
MDPC scheme against other BLH approaches, we imple-
Fig. 11: Effects of logarithmic linearization
mented a load-leveling scheme similar to the heuristic-driven
approach in [15], but in an MPC setting with a dual objective
to also minimise energy cost. More specifically, an MPC
problem for this scheme consists of
minimize
s,e,y,w
1
T + 1
t+T∑
τ=t
cτyτ +
µ
T + 1
t+T∑
τ=t
(yτ − yτ−1)2
subject to (s, e, y, w) ∈ F¯t,
where (s, e, y, w) ∈ F¯t enforces the system constraints (1),
(2), (3) and (4), and the binary restrictions on w. Fig. 12
illustrates the trade-off between mutual information and energy
cost for both the MDPC and Load-Leveling (LL) schemes
for different battery capacities. As can be seen in Fig. 12,
both schemes have increased energy costs with the reduction
in mutual information, which is expected. When balancing
between mutual information and energy cost, the MDPC
scheme out-performs load-leveling, generally achieving lower
mutual information for a similar cost of energy.
While both schemes are able to achieve similar levels of
minimum privacy loss according to the proxy Ic for the
different battery capacities, the resultant grid-load curves are
quite different, as seen in Fig. 13. The grid load curve for
the MDPC scheme shown in Fig. 13(a) no longer resembles
the diurnal pattern of the actual consumer load, whereas
this pattern can be clearly discerned from the load-leveling
grid load curves shown in Fig. 13(b), which suggest that
they should leak more information. These results strongly
suggest that the mutual information proxy used by the MDPC
scheme and for the evaluations is unable to capture these
important properties, which is expected since they are related
to time correlation. It is interesting (and perhaps surprising)
that despite the proxy not being able to fully capture time
correlation, the MDPC scheme is able mask the diurnal pattern
in consumer load profiles.
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(a) 3.2 kWh battery
(b) 6.4 kWh battery
(c) 12.8 kWh battery
Fig. 12: Trade-off between Ic and energy cost of MDPC and
Load-Leveling with different battery capacities
(a) MDPC with µ = 20
(b) Load-Leveling with µ = 30 and 1080
Fig. 13: Consumer vs grid load curves of MDPC and
Load-Leveling
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an MPC-based controller that
balances energy costs and privacy protection based on mutual
information. This is done by predicting the effects of the
controller’s actions on the statistics of the consumer load
and that seen by the grid using counting, and solving MIQP
problems of manageable size whenever new meter readings
are available. While not computationally scalable with pre-
diction horizon and discretization levels of load seen by the
grid, the results obtained showed that the controller is able
to reduce information leakage and hence protect consumer
privacy. Extensive experiments were carrier out in this work
to thoroughly characterize the performance of the proposed
controller. In particular, the effects of battery size, power
ratings, prediction horizon lengths, and discretization were
studied. Comparing the scheme against load-leveling also
indicated an improvement in balancing between energy cost
and consumer privacy protection. An important result of this
work is that it shows that practical schemes that specifically
target the minimization of a rigorous measure of privacy loss,
such as the one proposed here, are possible.
Future work will focus on enlarging the reach of the
prediction horizon, accounting for time correlation of the
load consumptions, including more sophisticated probability
estimation techniques, comparing the approach to other BLH
schemes, and exploring MIQP relaxation methods to make the
scheme more computationally scalable.
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